Synopsis

Recent Developments in the
Law of the Sea
1980-1981

This Synopsis highlights major developments occurring between December 1980 and December 1981 in the law of the sea. It
concentrateson the two meetings of the tenth session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).
It also discusses significant events that occurred outside the UNCLOS III.1

THE TENTH SESSION OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Introduction
The Ninth Session of UNCLOS 1I2 offered hope for the conclusion of negotiations and the ratification of an international Con1. The primary sources used to compile this Synopsis include United Nations
documents, United Nations press releases, The United Nations Monthly Chronicle,

InternationalLegal Materials,The UnitedStates Departmentof State Bulletin, Department of State internal documents, United States Code Congressionalrnd Ad-

ministrative News, Marine Policy, the New York Times, Worldwide Reports, Law
of the Sea, the London Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the San Diego Union.
2. For a detailed discussion of the Eighth session, see Synopsis, Recent Devel-

opments in the Law of the Sea 1978-1979, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 691 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 1978-1979].

For additional background see

Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth
Session, 75 Am. J. INV'L L 211 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Oxman Ninth Session].
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vention on the Law of the Sea.3
Developments at the Tenth Session dashed these hopes and left
the future law of the sea uncertain. A participant in negotiations
4
since 1974, the United States decided to reevaluate its position.
Over 150 national delegations were routinely preparing for the
New York meeting of the Tenth Session of UNCLOS H when the
5
United States announced:
After consultation with the other interested departments and agencies of
the United States government, the Secretary of State has instructed our
representative to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference to seek to
ensure that the negotiations do not end at the present session of the conference pending a policy review by the United States Government. The
interested departments and agencies have begun studies of the serious
problems raised by the draft convention and these will be the subject of a
thorough review which will determine our position towards the
negotiations.

Since this release the United States has neither participated in
formal negotiations nor declared its new policy. Although the
United States attended both the March meeting in New York and
the August meeting in Geneva, it merely "observed" events and
6
occasionally expressed its views about provisions in the treaty.
Despite this new atmosphere of uncertain commitment, the
Tenth Session retained the structure of previous sessions. 7 At the
New York meeting, the Conference elected Tommy T.B. Koh of
Singapore as the new president. 8 He replaced H. Shirley Amer3. A Draft Convention Informal Text was produced. See Draft Convention,
U.N. Doc. A/ConL62/L98/Rev. 4 (1981).
4. Edmonson & Green, Preface, 5 MAnNE POL'Y 171 (1981).
5. United States Press Release (March 2, 1981) (posted at the United States
Department of State).
6. The Administration wants changes in the draft of a projected charter on
man's use of the sea. It has not declared a policy. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § 1, at
11, col 1. "The sudden reversal of U.S. law of the sea policy on 2 March 1981, followed by the dismissal of top delegation personnel five days later, took foreign delegates by surprise.... ."Kimball, Update-the Tenth Session, 5 MARIM POL'Y 287,
288 (1981).
7. It consisted of three main committees. Committee I dealt with management and control of deep seabed resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Committee II covered jurisdictional issues within the territorial sea, the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas. Committee In
developed regimes regulating marine pollution and scientific research. On several
occasions the Conference met in Informal Plenary. See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea: 1977-1978, 16 SAN DiNGo L. Rv.705, 707-13 (1979).
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened in 1974. Since
then sessions have been held annually. UNCLOS is the longest and largest plenipotentiary Conference ever convened. At the last meeting of the Tenth Session,
153 states participated in negotiations. For a history of the Conference see U.N.
Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/376, at 28(Feb. 27, 1980).
8. Speaking as the newly elected President on March 13, Mr. Koh paid tribute
to the memory of the late President. He said his strong leadership had brought
the Conference to agree on more than 300 articles of the Draft Convention and
eight annexes, without resorting to voting. U.N. MoNTELY CHRON., May, 1981, at 12.
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isanghe, of Sri Lanka, who had served as Conference President
since the beginning of the Conference in 1973. The agenda of the
meeting dealt with issues identified at the end of the Ninth Session as still outstanding.9 These issues were: the question of delimitation of maritime boundaries between nations with opposite
or adjacent coasts,1 0 the preparatory commission of the deep seabed,"l the participation clause,' 2 and the protection of preparatory
investments.' 3 Without United States' participation, many nations refused to negotiate issues and little progress was made.14
The resumed Tenth Session in Geneva continued discussion of
the same issues.15 By the end of the session, only the delimitation of boundaries question had been resolved. 6 The Conference
decided to issue a new text of the Draft Convention, incorporating
changes made by the Drafting Committee.' 7 The words informal
9. The recommendations of the agenda by the collegium, to the General Assembly were made based upon U.N. Doc. A/Conf./62/BUR.13/Rev. 1 (1980). The
collegium consists of the President of the Conference, the chairmen of the three
main committees, the Rapporteur General, and the chairman of the Drafting
Committee.
10. ' The collegium took note of the fact that the two interest groups, led respectively by Iceland and Spain, on the question of delimitation of maritime
boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, would like to meet
during this session to continue their consultations." U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/110
(1981).
11. During an interim period, the Preparatory Commission would be charged
with receiving State sponsored mining applications, granting priorities to sites requested, and banking reserved sites for use by the Enterprise or by developing
countries. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/148 (Aug. 27, 1981).
12. A participation clause deals with who is eligible to participate in the
treaty. The basic question is which entity exercised competence with respect to
Law of the Sea matters and can be held legally and financially responsible. U.N.
MONTHLY CHRON., May, 1981, at 12.
13. This concerns the treatment to be accorded to the preparatory investments
made before the Convention enters into force. The Chairman of the First Committee informed the collegium that in view of the uncertain attitude of the United
States delegation towards the Draft Convention in general, and towards Part XI in
particular, the Group of 77 has informed him that it is not prepared to negotiate
the question until the attitude of the United States delegation towards Part XI
is clarified. The Group of 77 is a bloc of approximately 110 underdeveloped
countries.
14. Kimball, Update-The Tenth Session, 5 MARINE POL'Y 287, 288 (1981).
15. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/BUR/SR.64 (prov. ed. 1981). The agenda at the resumed Tenth Session was not different from that of the New York meeting.
16. San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col 2.
17. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Revision I, II, III (which is
called Draft Convention Informal Text) constitutes the basic negotiating document for the Draft Treaty. See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the
Sea 1979-1980, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 535, 536 n.7 (1981).

text are removed, meaning this text is now considered the formal
text.18 The Conference chose Jamaica as the site for the projected International Seabed Authority19 and Hamburg, West Germany for the location of the Sea Tribunal. 20 The Tenth Session
adjourned with the expectation of completing all formal work on
the Convention at the New York meeting scheduled for March
1982.21

The New York Meeting, March 9-April 24, 1981
The United States Position
The United States' decision to reevaluate its position toward
the Draft Convention took the meeting by surprise.2 2 The Reagan
administration felt that it was "better to face criticism" in the
United Nations for its decision to review the Law of the Sea
Treaty than to conclude a treaty which failed to adequately advance United States' interests. 2 3 While no one disputed the
United States' claim that it had a right to review the treaty before
signing it,24 the timing and the possibility of renewed discussion
that might unravel previously negotiated provisions led to
criticisms.2 5
The United States' opposition focuses on the deep seabed mining issue. First, the United States criticizes specific provisions in
the treaty that impact on the interests of private groups. Second,
the United States opposes the principle of an international regime
governing seabed mineral development. Fundamental to the latter objection is the Convention's position that the ocean's riches
beyond the 200 mile territorial limit are the "common heritage of
mankind." 26 Some opponents argue that this position interferes
18. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/146, at 1 (Aug. 24, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as SEA/146].
19. San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col 2.
20. l
21. Id
22. See The United States and the Law of the Sea: A Review of the Issues, at
1, col 1 (United Nations Association of the United States Educational Supplement) (on fie with the author) [hereinafter cited as The United States and the
Law of the Sea].
23. Soundings, Law of the Sea News and Comment, June-July 1981, at 1 [hereinafter referred to as Soundings, June-July 1981].
24. The United States and the Law of the Sea, supra note 22, at 1, col 1. Some
delegates felt that a review would call for substantial revisions of the text.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2, col 3. Ambassador Pardo of Malta awakened the U.N. General Assembly to the concept. A U.N. declaration gave the concept its final form. 'The
sea-bed and the ocean floor.., beyond the limits of national jurisdiction... are
the common heritage of mankind... and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof."
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with the free enterprise system. 27 The draft treaty is further criti28
cized by these opponents as a giveaway to the Third World.
The United States concerns were first spelled out when Ambassador James L. Malone testified before a subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 2 9 He identified the following critical problems:
The Draft Convention places under burdensome international regulation the development of all of the resources of the seabed and subsoil
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, representing approximately
two-thirds of the earth's submerged lands. 3 0 These resources include
polymetallic nodules. They also include mineral deposits beneath the
surface of the seabed about which nothing is known today, but which
may be of very substantial economic importance in the future.
The Draft Convention would establish a supranational mining company,
called the Enterprise, which would benefit from significant discrimina31
tory advantages relative to the companies of industrialized countries.
Arguably, it could eventually monopolize production of seabed minerals.
Moreover, the Draft Convention requires the U.S. and other nations to
fund the initial capitalization
of the Enterprise, in proportion to their
32
contributions to the U.N.
Through its transfer of technology provisions, the Draft Convention
compels the sale of proprietary information and technology now largely
in U.S. hands. Under the Draft Convention, with certain restrictions, the
Enterprise, through mandatory transfer, is guaranteed access on request to the seabed mining technology owned by private companies and
also technology used by them but owned by others. The text further guarantees similar access to privately-owned technology by any developing country planning to go into seabed mining. We must also carefully consider how such provisions relate to security-related
technology. 33
The Draft Convention limits the annual production of manganese nodules from the deep seabed, as well as the amount which any company
27. "One thing wrong with 'common heritage' is that it destroys the idea of private property and the incentive to risk money to explore and develop. Who wants
to invest in a company sharing the seabed with a collectivist combine, and subject
to the regulation of the 'Authority'?" Saffire, The GreatRipoff, reprintedin United
States and the Law of the Sea, supra note 22, at 1, coL 1.
28. Id. at 2, col. 3. "This treaty as it stands is an ideological surrender to third
world demands for a 'new world economic order'."
29. James L. Malone, testimony before the Subcomm. on Oceanography,
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr.
28, 1981) (copy circulated by the Dept. of State).
30. See Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 157, para. 1.
31. The Enterprise is the organ of the International Seabed Authority that
would conduct deep seabed mining. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art 170, para.
1.
32. Speech by Tommy T.B. Koh, Should the United States Ratify the New Law
of the Sea Treaty? (June 4, 1980) (for J. Seward Johnson Lectures in Marine Policy) [hereinafter cited as Tommy T.B. Koh]. See Draft Convention, supra note 3,
art. 160, para. 2(e).
33. Draft Convention, supra note 3, Annex II, arL 5.

can mine for the first twenty years of production. 34 The stated purpose
of these controls is to avoid damaging the economy of any country
which produces the same commodities on land. In short, it attempts to
insulate land-based producers from competition with seabed mining. In
doing so the draft treaty could discourage potential investors, thereby
creating artificial scarcities. In allocating seabed production, the International Seabed Authority is granted substantial discretion to select
among competing applicants. Such discretion could be used to deny
contracts to qualified American companies.
-The Draft Convention creates a one-nation one-vote international organization which is governed by an Assembly35 and a 36 member Executive
Council. In the Council, the Soviet Union and its allies have three guaranteed seats, but the U.S. must compete with its allies for any representation. The Assembly is characterized as the "supreme" organ and the
specific policy decisions of the Council must conform to the general policies of the Assembly.
-The Draft Convention provides that, after fifteen years of production,
the provisions of the treaty will be reviewed to determine whether it has
fulfilled overriding policy considerations, such as protection of landbased producers, promotion of Enterprise operations and equitabfe distribution of mining rights. If two-thirds of the States Parties to the
treaty wish to amend provisions concerning the system of exploitation,
they may do so after five years of negotiation and after ratification by
two thirds of the States Parties. If the U.S. were to disagree with duly
ratified changes, it would be bound by them nevertheless,
unless it exer36
cised its option to denounce the entire treaty.
-The Draft Convention imposes revenue sharing obligations on seabed
mining corporations
which would significantly increase the costs of sea37
bed mining.

-The Draft Convention imposes an international revenue sharing obligation on the production of hydrocarbons from the continental shelf beyond the 200 mile limit. Developing countries that are net-importers of
hydrocarbons are exempt from the obligation.
-The Draft Convention contains provisions concerning liberation movements, like the PLO, and their eligibility to obtain a share of the revenues of the Seabed Authority.
-The Draft Convention lacks any provisions for protecting investments
made prior to entry into force of the Convention. 38 (Author's footnotes)

The United States' new belief that the availability of natural resources is essential to its national security has also contributed to
the decision to reconsider the Draft Convention. Previously, the
United States primary security concern in the law of the sea area
was the freedom of seas for innocent passage. The emphasis now
has shifted to protection of United States' access to and interests
in ocean resources.
Criticisms of the United States announcement to review the
UNCLOS II1 Draft Convention have been advanced throughout
the world. In Moscow, Tass reported that the United States had
34. Id., art. 151, para. 2(a).
35. Id., art. 161.
36. Id., art. 155, paras. 1, 4. This could be against the provisions of the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
37. Draft Convention, .-upra note 3, art. 170, para. 4.
38. The United States did not negotiate at the Tenth Session, so the other nations refused to negotiate on this vital issue.
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demonstrated its inconsistency and unreliability as a partner in
international negotiations. 39 The Bulgaria delegate said the
40
United States had abandoned obligations already assumed.
Pravda reported that the Law of the Sea treaty would not be acceded to by the United States unless it insured United States'
mineral rights. 41 While these criticisms have come mainly from
Communist block countries and the Third World, our allies have
also been upset. Nonetheless, our allies believe that a treaty
without the support of the United States would be useless.42
Drafting Committee
The Drafting Committee met during the seven weeks before the
spring meeting and then daily throughout the session.43 The committee is undertaking an article by article textual review of the

Draft Convention to achieve the requisite harmonization, concordance, and consistency in the six language versions.4 4 At this
New York meeting delegates put much of their energy into this
area.45 During the meeting, the language groups and the Informal

Plenary met daily. A number of recommendations on the subject
matter of Committees H and III were approved.4 6 Others are still

pending.4 7
39. Tass (Moscow), Mar. 5, 1981, reprinted in 145 WoRLDw DE

REPORT, LAW OF

THE SEA 1 (1981).

40. BTA (Sofia), Mar. 5, 1981, translatedand reprintedin 145 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 10 (1981).

41. Pravda (Moscow), translated and reprinted in 145 WORLDWIDE REPORTS,
10 (1981).
42. San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col 1. Western countries were
trying to bridge the gap between the United States and the rest of the world on
the treaty. Financial Times (London), Aug. 11, 1981, reprintedin WORLD OPINION,
No. 25, Aug. 11, 1981 (service of Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission, Geneva) [hereinafter cited as WORLD OPInON].
43. U.N. MoNTm.y CHRON. May, 1981, at 13.
44. Oxman, Ninth Session, supra note 2, at 255. The situation might yield a
rule for interpreting this large and complex convention as suggested lightheartedly by one participant. "The use of the same terms in different places does not
necessarily indicate that the same meaning is intended: the use of different terms
in different places does not necessarily indicate that a different meaning is
intended."
45. Soundings, Law of the Sea News and Comment, April-May, 1981, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id Yet to be concluded is the work on the seabed mining portions of the
text and those in dispute settlement, general provisions, final clauses, the preamble and the definition of terms.
LAW OF THE SEA

Committee I
The chairman of Committee I, Paul Engo, and President
Tommy Koh both conducted debate on the plans for a Preparatory Commission. 48 This Commission will lay the groundwork for
the International Authority and the International Tribunal. Regulation of the development of the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdictions will be controlled
by these groups. 4 9 There was general agreement that the Commission should be established by a General Assembly Resolution.
Furthermore, there was broad recognition of the Commission's
objective to make provisional arrangements for the first session of
the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority and its
Council.
There was disagreement on membership requirements for the
Preparatory Commission. Some countries said it should be open
to all who signed the Final Act in the General Assembly while
others felt it should include only those who demonstrated an intention to be bound by the Draft Convention. Proponents of this
latter view felt this would encourage early commitment to the
treaty and prevent participation in the Commission by states
which might not adhere to the Draft Convention.5 0 Committee I
was able to agree on a voting procedure. Some nations insisted
on consensus and others favored an approach in which failure to
achieve consensus would be followed by voting. Because it was
mandated to be an interim body, there was general agreement
that the Commission's life should not be unduly long.5 ' All sides
agreed on having the United Nations provide initial funds for the
Commission, but some saw legal and practical difficulties arising

52
from this type of loan.

The First Committee also discussed a report by the Secretary
General on some of the effects of the Draft Convention's provisions for limiting seabed mineral production. 53 The report---"Effects of the Production Limitation Formula Under Certain
Specified Assumptions"--was requested by the Conference last
August on the proposal of the Philippines. The production limita48. Reporting to the Conference at its plenary meeting, Committee Chairman
Paul Engo said its work had proceeded under a cloud following the U.S. decision
to review the text. U.N. MoNTmy CHRON., May, 1981, at 19.
49. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 157; id Annex IV, art. 1.
50. See Kimball, Update-the Tenth Session, 5 MAR= PoL'Y 287, 289 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The first study will be discussed in further detail at the resumed session, along with a final topic: that of prohibiting resort to unfair economic practices such as subsidization of production or marketing of seabed minerals from the
international area.
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tion formula was aimed at encouraging the production of minerals
from the international seabed area while minimizing damage to
land-based production of the same minerals. The impact of this
provision could be to limit the mining of the deep-seabed. Manganese nodules which are found in the seabed contain nickel, cobalt, manganese and copper. 54 According to one estimate, 1.5
trillion tons of manganese nodules in the seabed await development. The report also summarized all the costs of seabed mineral
55
production, including the cost of the Seabed Authority.
Committee II
The report by the Chairman of this committee, Andres Aquileri
(Venezuela), stated that there was a virtual consensus that it
would not be desirable to reopen discussion on basic Second
Committee issues. 56 All substantive negotiations had been completed. A number of delegations objected to the Chairman's report because it failed to mention prior authorization.5 7 Some
members are in favor of requiring prior authorization or notification to coastal nations for the passage of warships in the territorial sea. This is opposed to the United States' position of the
Right of Innocent Passage.
Because of disagreement about the delimitation of boundaries
between adjacent or opposite states, a special negotiating team
was set up. It was comprised of two interest groups representing
different viewpoints. These two interest groups were led by Ireland and Spain, respectively. 58 The group led by Ireland favored
equidistance or median lines in the determination of maritime
boundaries between opposite and adjacent nations. 59 The group
54. Tommy T.B. Koh, supra note 32, at 14. Also discussed by Dr. Arvid Pardo
in a lecture to the International Law Society, University of San Diego School of
Law, November 25, 1981.
55. Administrative costs will range from 41 to 53 million dollars. Building and
equipment would cost between 104 and 229 million dollars. Three estimates were
given for the initial seabed mining venture: 900 million, 1,000 million, and 1,400
million dollars. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., May, 1981, at 20-21.
56. Id. at 21.
57. A third state has only the right of innocent passage through the territorial
seas of another state. See Tommy T.B. Kol, supra note 32, at 11. According to Dr.
Arvid Pardo, the reason has ceased to be such an important priority for the United
States is because of the advent of broad range missiles. See note 54 supra.
58. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/110 at 2 (1980).
59. See KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOcUMENTs, AND READINGS 6-5
(1980), for a discussion of equidistance versus equitable principles. Their con-

led by Spain favored using "equitable principles" to determine
these boundaries.60
Committee III
Chairman Yankov of Bulgaria reported that substantial negotiations had also been completed on topics assigned to Committee
MI.
Pakistan introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the Group of
77 aimed at improving the national marine seabed technology and
ocean service infrastructure in developing countries. 61 The recommendation requested that all competent United Nation's organizations expand programs within their respective fields of
competence related to seabed development. 62 Special assistance
should be given to developing countries. Furthermore, services
should be coordinated on a systemwide basis so that programs
will be implemented without disfavoring the coastal, land-locked
or otherwise geographically disadvantaged nations. 63
The Geneva Meeting, August 3-August 28, 1981
Delegates at the resumed Tenth Session in Geneva once again
refused to negotiate many issues because the United States did
not participate in negotiations. The results of the Tenth Session
were incorporated into a fourth revision of the negotiating text,
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. The words "Informal
Text" were removed.6 4 Ambassador James Malone, the Special
Representative of the President of the United States for UNCLOS
III, presented the United States' position in Informal Plenary.65
cerns were with the continental shelf and delimitation of boundaries. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 74.
60. Id.
61. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., June, 1981, at 21. The sponsor urged the Conference to act on it at its resumed session in August so the General Assembly could
endorse it during its next session beginning in September.
62. Id.
63. This group "[rlecommends that the World Bank, the regional banks, the
United Nations Development Programme, the Interim Fund on Science and Technology and other multilateral funding agencies augment and coordinate their operations for the provision of funds to developing countries for the preparation and
implementation of major programmes of assistance in strengthening their marine
science, technology and ocean sciences." U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.68 (1981). This
resolution was revised at the Geneva meeting and issued as U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
L.79 (1981).
64. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.78 (1981).
65. Statement by Ambassador James L. Malone to the Informal Plenary, of the
Tenth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea, Geneva,
Aug. 5, 1981 (unpublished copy circulated by the State Department) (on ifie with
the author) [hereinafter cited as statement by James L. Malone, Aug. 5, 1981].
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The United States' Position
Once the United States' review of the law of the sea was started
in March, it was undertaken in a deliberate and systematic fashion. The Defense Community, the House and Senate, other nations and the private sector participated in the "thorough"
review. 66 Nonetheless, the review was not completed before the
August meeting of UNCLOS 1I.67 The United States presented
its position and tried to assess reactions, but did not negotiate. 68
Mr. Malone had been reluctant to make a broad statement but
69
many delegations requested that a general statement be made.
Mr. Malone addressed the delegates at an informal meeting of the
Plenary. The United States' reasons for undertaking review were
reiterated:
As most of you know, my government undertook its review of the Draft
Convention because the people of the United States, through their electoral process, have expressed their preference for a variety of policies that
affect the work of the conference. Mr. President, my country's political
70
leaders cannot and should not ignore the mandate.

Then areas of concern were expressed:
Our review of the Draft Convention has revealed that Part XI of the text
would, in its present form be a stumbling block to treaty ratification. ...
We intend at this session, if we are given the opportunity to do so, to engage in intensive discussion to elaborate with precision and detail the
71
points which have been raised in our review.
72 is an area that is specifically

Part XI of the Draft Convention
related to the international seabed.73 Ambassador James Malone

66. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, before
the Marine Technology Society, Sept. 8, 1981 (on file with the author).
67. The United States review process was accelerated between the two sessions but the missing ingredient was an assessment of the negotiability of areas of
concern with the Draft Convention that had been identified in the review process.
U.S. Delegation Report, Tenth Session of the Third United Nations Conference of
the Law of the Sea, New York, Mar. 9-Apr. 24, 1981 and Geneva, Aug. 3-Aug. 28,
1981, at 3 (unpublished report on file with the author) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
Delegation Report].
68. Id at 4. 'The U.S. delegation placed primary emphasis on finding opportunities in which reasoned debate and discussion could occur so as to assist in assessment of the negotiability which it was instructed to make."
69. Statement by James L. Malone, Aug. 5, 1981, supra note 65.
70. Id.
71. 1d&
72. 1d
73. The mining of manganese nodules is at the heart of the deep seabed controversy. Nodule mining is characterized by technology in the hands of a few companies from industrialized countries grouped into international consortia. The
United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, West Germany, France and the Nether-

voiced many of the same concerns he had testified to before Congress in the spring. Policy objections were stressed. One particular concern with Part XI relates to decision making in the
International Seabed Authority. Burdensome regulation of the
seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction would be created
by the treaty.7 4 The scope of the Assembly's power and its relationship to the Council are of particular concern to the United
States. One country or a group of countries could dominate
others where vital interests are at stake. The Assembly, acting as
a "supreme organ", might seek to use ambiguous treaty provisions. This could increase its discretion and have an impact on
the Council's executive function or even the rights of states.7 5
Although the composition, procedure and voting in the Council
have been decided after intense and difficult negotiations, the
United States still doubts its interests are adequately protected.
A certain lack of equilibrium exists. The Soviet Union and its allies have three guaranteed seats but the United States must compete with its allies for any representation.76
Questions have also been raised about voting in the Council.
The present voting system could paralyze the Council with ease.
There should be a means to simplify decision making on certain
subjects while assuring the countries in a minority position an ef-

77
fectual voice on issues of vital interest to them.

The administrative machinery in Part XI also raises questions
with respect to awards of contracts. There is no assurance that
the legal and technical commission of the Authority78 will grant a
right of access to a qualified applicant submitting a formal written
plan of work. Moreover, it is not even clear that the plan of work
79
will be acted upon at all

Another concern deals with discrimination.8 0 While the Draft
lands, are all exploring possibilities. Richardson, The United States and the Current Status of Deep Seabed Mining at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 11 ENVT'L L.Q. 193 (1980-81).
74. See Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 153.
75. Id. art. 157, para. 2.
76. The United States would seek an arrangement for permanent representation by the U.S. on the Council, as the socialist group of Eastern European countries have under the present Draft Convention. U.S. Delegation Report, supra
note 67, at 7.
77. The United States should have a stronger voice in the Council's decisions.
The method of decision making could undercut the effectiveness of the executive
council Id. at 6.
78. The Authority is the international body which will supervise the conduct
of deep seabed mining.
79. Access of United States Nationals could not be assured under the Draft
Convention. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 67, at 7.
80. See Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 153. There were many discriminatory provisions which taken together with the powers and functions of the Assem-
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Convention expressly admonishes discrimination in Article 153,81
the vulnerability of national economics created by the lack of critical raw materials makes it important to assure all states a right
of access to seabed resources without discrimination. The United
States believes that developing countries and the Enterprise are
82
favored to the "detriment" of others.
The Authority's policies with respect to promotion of mineral
resource development is another concern. The United States is
sensitive to dependence upon foreign sources for raw materials.
"There is a widespread view in the United States that for the benefit of all mankind a Law of the Sea Treaty should encourage and
promote the development of deep seabed resources."8 3 The treaty
gives the impression that encouragement and promotion are not
overriding policy objectives of the Draft Convention.8 4
After fifteen years the Draft Convention provides that the provisions of the treaty will be reviewed. After five years, a two-thirds
vote could ratify an amendment.8 5 The United States would be
bound by the ratified changes. Here a constitutional question is
raised.8 6 The problem is: can the United States be bound by an
amendment to a treaty when the amendment does not have the
advice and consent of the Senate?
The United States is likewise concerned that the treaty unreasonably interferes with governmental operations and budgetary
considerations of individual nations.8 7 "Our government is embarked on a course to reduce inflation and stimulate productivity."88 The Draft Convention may create a situation where funds
provided in part by the United States government would eclipse
bly and the Council could interefere with mining operations. U.S. Delegation
Report, supra note 67, at 7.
81. Actually the Authority and the Enterprise were created on the assumption
that they would have a monopoly. Production controls are nonsense, according to
Dr. Arvid Pardo. Lecture by Dr. Arvid Pardo to the International Law Society,
University of San Diego, Nov. 25, 1981. To continue to compete, nations only have
to shift jurisdiction. Also copper sulphate found in the Pacific have many minerals
that are the same as those found in manganese. When national jurisdiction extends over manganese nodules or copper sulphate deposits, controls weaken.
82. Statement by James L. Malone, Aug. 5, 1981, supra note 65.
83. Id.
84. This is for the protection of the land-based producers of the same minerals. See Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 155, para. 1.
85. Id. art. 155, para. 4.
86. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IA § 2.
87. Statement by James L. Malone, Aug. 5, 1981, supra note 65.
88. Id.

mining activities by private American companies. 89
A few weeks later Ambassador Malone issued a further statement to the Group of 21. He described eight specific areas in
which United States' objectives are not met adequately by the
Draft Convention. They offer a succinct statement of the Draft
Convention articles found by the United States to be
objectionable: 90
1. the powers and functions of the Assembly
2. the composition of and decision making in the Council
3. the Authority's policies with respect to promotion of mineral resource
development
4. the predictability of access for private companies
5. discrimination in favor of the Enterprise as it affects the competitive
position of private companies
6. the Review Conference-in particular, the applicability of any amendments adopted by it that lack the advice and consent of the Senate
7. discretionary powers that could lead to unreasonable interference with
operations, and
8. the budgetary impacts on individual nations of obligations created by
a law of the sea treaty.

The United States asked the other nations to react to this list of
objections.9 These reactions and comments are to be weighed
decisions on whether or
before the United States makes any final
92
not to support the Draft Convention.
The Chairman of the Group of 77, Mr. Inam ul Haq, stressed
problems inherent in any attempts to reopen negotiations at this
advanced stage. These negotiations had been participated in and
approved by the United States for nine sessions of UNCLOS. The
Group of 77 did not feel that they should be asked to negotiate
further or make any further concessions.9 3 The opinion of the
Third World spokesman was that the Draft Convention already
represents compromises made by both the industrialized countries and developing countries. He stated:9 4
The text appearing in ICNT Rev. III is not a text proposed to the liking of
the States members of the Group of 77. We have no desire to defend it.
We have traveled a long way from our original position. We have made all
89. The United States delegation indicated that the United States was troubled by uncertainties with respect to the total cost of the treaty to the United States
Treasury, and on the effect of financial obligations on the profitability of mining
operations. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 67, at 10.
90. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
91. &L

92. Id. Reports of various groups in the United States studying the situation
will also be weighed. See, e.g., I. Keating, The Law of the Sea Treaty- An Overall
Assessment with Recommendations for Executive Action (Dec. 15, 1980) (unpublished report by member of President-elect Reagan's Foreign Policy Advisory
Council and Strategic Minerals Task Force) (on file with author).
93. Statement by Inam Ul-Haq to the Informal Plenary, Tenth Session of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, Aug. 17, 1981
(unpublished copy circulated on the meeting floor on file with the author).
94. Id.
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concessions possible, more should not be asked of us. In all negotiations a
stage is reached where the participants must call a halt to any further demands. We have sacrificed too many interests. We cannot sacrifice anymore. Nor can we afford to permit the labour of many years to slip
through our fingers; ....
The eight objectives spelled out by Ambassador
Malone9 5 cannot form the basis of a dialogue which the United States
seeks.

Since the Draft Convention is based upon consensus, its various parts are intertwined. "The unraveling of even one minipackage could result in a breakdown of the whole package that
has been put together after years of negotiation." 96 Senyon P.
Kozyrev, the Soviet negotiator, charged the United States with
wanting to "wreck the negotiations to free its hands for unilateral
action to seize arbitrarily the sea space and the resources of the
world oceans." 97 He himself then raised objections to parts of the
proposal.9 8 Nonetheless, Kozyrev argued that a revision of the
Convention to meet United States' objections would destroy the
entire package of compromise decisions underlying the Draft
Convention. Since Part XI is an organic constituent element of
the compromise, it cannot be changed. 99 Likewise Ambassador
Jen Evenson of Norway also likened the compromises reached in
the convention to a package deal, which comprises the totality.1 0 0
On the contrary other opinions gave support to the United
States' position.O' Most western countries cannot imagine any
treaty being concluded without the United States' agreement.
These countries believe a consensus with the United States' support is indispensable to the effective application of the future
Convention. 0 2 France's position was that there would be no real
value to an agreement on the exploration of the seabed if it did
not involve the United States, West Germany and the most tech95. Id.
96. Id.
97. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1981, § A, at 5, col 2.
98. Id.
99. Statement by the S.P. Kozyrev to the General Committee, Tenth Session
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 17, 1981 (unofficial translation distributed at the Conference on fie with the author).
100. Statement by Ambassador Jens Evenson (Norway) to the Informal Plenary, Tenth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Geneva, Aug. 10, 1981 (copy circulated at the Conference on file with the
author).

101. Even President Koh said that though delay was regrettable, a Draft Convention without the participation of a major maritime power would be a weakened
convention. U.N. MONTHLY CHRoN., May, 1981, at 13.
102. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § A, at 11, col. 1.

nologically advanced countries in this field.l03 West Germany
04
also has taken a hard line and supported the United States.
Presently, the United States' review of the Draft Convention
has reached the point where options are being considered. The
options will be presented to President Reagan for his decision. 0 5
The United States could withdraw from the Convention, accept
the Convention or go back in March and continue negotiations. If
the decision is to go back and negotiate at the Eleventh Session of
UNCLOS I, we will need a great deal of help from our allies and
a strong negotiating team.
With the United States keeping mostly to the sidelines, the
Conference did not accomplish a great deal at Geneva. A significant amount of time was spent on the discussion of the United
States' position and review. However, certain matters were discussed and decided. Although Committee II and Committee III
did not meet, Committee I met regularly and work was accomplished by the Draft Committee and the Informal Plenary. Plans
were to continue to attempt to resolve matters unresolved by the
Ninth Session of UNCLOS

]][.106

Drafting Committee
Once again a great deal of time at the Geneva meeting was devoted to drafting problems. 07 The Drafting Committee met continuously from June 29 until the end of the Conference. Work
was done on the disputes settlement and conciliation texts. 0 8
Also, language changes for Part XI, Articles 188, 190, 191 were
approved.109
It is the duty of the Drafting Committee to adjust the wording
of the text in order to insure the future Convention would be le103. See Le Monde (Paris), Aug. 20, 1981, reprintedin Woinu OPinmON, supra
note 42, No. 31, Aug. 20, 1981.
104. "So far, the Federal Republic of Germany has opposed the proposed seabed regime, to no avail. But now it has a strong ally in the United States." Frankfurter Allgemine (Germany), Aug. 4, 1981, translated and reprinted in WoRLD
OPMnON, supra note 42, No. 29, Aug. 18, 1981. "Developing countries have turned
That is why the United
down flat the United States request for renegotiation ....
States now stands in need of support from parties of significant political weightfor example, the EEC (European Economic Community). But if the EEC failed to
produce a common standpoint, member countries dissatisfied with the Draft Convention such as Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany would have to go it
alone. The German delegation will have to prove its mettle." Handelsblatt (Germany), Aug. 13, 1981, translatedand reprintedin WoRLD OPInION, supra note 42,
No. 29, Aug. 18, 1981.
105. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
106. U.N. Doe. A/ConL62/BUR/SR.64 (prov. ed. 1981).
107. Id.
108. Statement by James L. Malone, Aug. 5, 1981, supra note 65.
109. U.N. Doc. A/ConL62/L.75/Add.4 (1981).
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gally enforceable in all languages. Although the Drafting Committee was under a sense of urgency, they were anxious to do the
job well. This demanded patience, work and skill.
Committee I

The Working Group of 21110 met regularly and continued work
on the arrangements for the Preparatory Commission. Yet some
important Preparatory Commission questions still need to be answered. These include: which states should be members of the
Commission, how it should make decisions, and how it should be
financed and when it should be terminated? Discussion continued on all of these, while decisions were postponed until the
Eleventh Session."'1
Committee II

Committee II did not meet formally during the Geneva meeting.112 Negotiation continued on the issue of delimitation of
boundaries between nations with adjacent coasts." 3 The solution
presented by President Koh received support from both negotiating groups that had been working on the issue."14 Decision will
be left to the states with adjacent coasts concerned to reach an
equitable agreement by direct negotiations."15 Although the
United States, Arab countries, Israel and Venezuela all asked that
110. The Working Group of 21 was formed at the request of developing nations
to consider Committee I issues in a smaller forum. This is a group of limited
membership, co-chaired by the President of UNCLOS and the Chairman of Committee L
111. U.N. Doc. A/Conf62/BUR/SR.64 (prov. ed. 1981).
112. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
113. Id.
114. 'The Conference achieved agreement on the elimination of any express
reference to median or equidistance line, and limited the entire provision to a rule
of delimitation by agreement...." U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 67, at 13.
115. Article 74(1) now reads:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Article 83(1) now reads:
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Cf. Second Revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/ConL62/
WP.10/Rev.2 (1980), arts. 74(1), 83(1) (the text of the articles prior to the change).

the matter be deferred, it was decided to include the solution in
the revision of the Draft Convention.116 Delimitation was the only
problem area left over from the Ninth Session of UNCLOS m that
was resolved at the Tenth Session.117
Informal Plenary
At the meeting in Geneva an indicative vote was taken in informal plenary to choose sites for the proposed International SeaBed Authority and the proposed Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea."18 Moreover, all of the candidates agreed in advance to be
bound by the results of the voting. The site selection will only apply if the state selected is a party to the Convention when it enters into force.119 Jamaica was chosen as the site of the projected
Seabed Authority and Hamburg in West Germany was chosen as
the site of the Tribunal.120 Germany gave the following reasons to
support Hamburg's selection as the site of the Tribunal:
Hamburg is a city of high international standing which would be a
representative seat for such an institution and it offers all the facilities for the Tribunal to function effectively and successfully.l21
At the conclusion of the Conference the delegates decided to issue a new text of the Draft Convention.l22 To provide the revision
with a "higher status than the present text" the Conference decided it would be given the document symbol "A/CONF.62/
L.78".123 The new text can only be changed in accordance with
the rule of consensus and no amendment can be submitted until
all efforts to achieve consensus are exhausted.124 Tommy Koh
commented on the proposal to convert the informal text into an
"official" text: "This is not just putting on some cosmetics that do
116. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
117. San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 2.
118. SEA/146, supra note 18, at 2, 3.

119. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
120. San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col.1.

121. U.N. Doc. A/ConL62/111 (1981). The Federal Republic of Germany, a country with a short coast line, belongs to the group of landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged states.
122. SEA/146, supra note 18, at 1. At the same time it decided that "the door

would be kept open for the continuation of consultations and negotiations on cer-

tain issues." This revised text incorporated over 1500 Drafting Committee
changes. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 67, at 16, 17.
123. SEA/146, supra note 18, at 3. By assigning the symbol "L" the text was elevated to an official status. Id.
124. Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66. It was
not made a formal text closed to negotiation and open to formal amendments, but
by deleting the words informal text in its title and giving it an official limited docu-

ment number, it gave the text a higher status. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note
67, at 17.
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not have any legal meaning."125 He said it was a "very significant
and definitive step."
It will be the official Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea of the Conference subject, however, to the following three conditions:
First, the door would be kept open for the continuation of consultations
and negotiations on certain outstanding issues. The results of these consultations and negotiations if they satisfy the criterion in A/CONF.62/62,
will be incorporated in the Draft Convention by the collegium without the
need for formal amendments.
Second, the Drafting Committee will complete its work and its further recommendations, approved by the Informal Plenary, will be incorporated in
the text.
Third, in view of the fact that the process of consultations and negotiations on certain outstanding issues will continue, the time has, therefore,
not arrived for
the application of rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the
12 6
Conference.

This leaves open the possibility of further negotiation with the
United States and of final adoption of a text.
A work schedule was decided upon for the Eleventh Session. It
provides time for additional negotiations in pending issues and a
vote to formalize and adopt the Draft Convention.127 The Eleventh Session will last eight weeks. The first three weeks will be
reserved for negotiations and consultations. Several days will
then be devoted to reviewing the results of the negotiations and
producing a new text.128 The Conference will then meet on April
6, to decide on the date on which to begin the formal procedures
of amendment submission.129 The remaining weeks will allow for
voting. The Convention will open in Caracas, Venezuela in early
September, 1982.130
The Conference President, Tommy T. B. Koh, said the Conference gave the United States a clear signal that it intended to complete the treaty at the New York meeting. He has vowed to
achieve a treaty in the next "spring's session come hell or high
water" and with or without the United States.131
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

SEA/146, supra note 18, at 1.
U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 67 at 17.
Statement by Theodore G. Kronmiller, Sept. 8, 1981, supra note 66.
Id.
Id.
SEA/146, supra note 18, at 1.
San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 1.

DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND TIE CONFERENCE

Disputes Concerning Sovereignty over Coastal Waters
While negotiations proceed on UNCLOS, unilateral declarations
by states asserting their dominion over specified zones continue
to be made.' 32 Libya's Col. Muammar Khadafy, for example,
maintains that all the Gulf of Sidia, from its inner shoreline to its
200-mile wide mouth, is within the boundaries of Libyan territo33
rial waters.1
The United States continues to hold on to the old fashioned position that territorial waters end three miles offshore, or the limit
a medieval cannon could throw an iron ball. Col. Khadafy claims
Libya is entitled to absolute sovereignty, as opposed to simply resource ownership in the 200-mile zone.1 34 Most countries that
have extended their fishing zones to 200 miles call this zone an
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that does not infringe upon the
"right of innocent passage". 35 Khadafy's claims are disputed
and, therefore, unrecognized by almost every nation on earth, in3 6
cluding the United States.
In August, 1981, two United States jets were conducting naval
exercises in the southern Mediterranean and northern part of the
Gulf of Sidia.13 7 Libyan planes intercepted and fired upon the
jets, claiming they were in Libyan air space.' 38 The Libyan planes
were warned and eventually shot down by the American jets
132. The boundaries are generally 200 nautical miles from the states coast for
economic and fishing zones, and 12 miles from the coast for the territorial sea. For
a background in boundaries see KNIGHT, supra note 59, at 3-1 to 3-30. See also Re-

cent Development 1978-1979, supra note 2, at 718 n.140.
133. "What Libyan President Khadafy has done is to take the concept of the 200
mile economic zone and has applied it to his country's territorial waters." Advocate News (Bridgetown), Aug. 23, 1981, at 4, reprintedin 170 WORLDWME REPORTS,
LAw OF THE SEA 12 (1981).

The United States Fishing Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 180-182 (1976) declares the United States will have exclusive fishing management authority within the zone.

134. In 1973, by unilateral proclamation, Libya claimed the whole Gulf south of
a line drawn along latitude 32030' as its internal waters. It ran its 12 mile wide
strip of territorial waters along this baseline instead of along the shore. The Gulf
of Sidia is 300 miles wide. The Economist, Aug. 29, 1981.
135. High Seas freedom permits surface passage beyond the twelve mile contiguous zone, while allowing coastal States to enforce certain customs and immigration regulation in the twelve mile zone. The United States and the Law of the Sea,

supra note 23, at 2.
136. San Diego Union, Aug. 20, 1981, § A, at 8, col. 5. The existing international

law on this issue is contained in the 1958 U.N. Convention on the Territorial Sea,
which Libya did not accept. The Economist, Aug. 29, 1981.

137. American and Libyan aircraft clashed in the sky above the Mediterranean
on August 19, 1981.
138. See KNIGHT, supra note 59, at 1-2.
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when they did not turn away. 3 9 United States President Ronald
Reagan subsequently told Libya that United States naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean would go forward in the future as
planned.14
Extension of Sovereignty over Fishing and TerritorialWaters
States continue to declare sovereignty over waters extending
200 miles from their shore.141 Oman extended its economic zone
200 miles seaward on February 20, 1981142 and Thailand announced a 200 mile economic zone on February 23, 1981.-43 Efforts
were also being made to extend the exclusive economic zone of

India, which is now between 12 nautical miles and 200 nautical
miles. 4 4
In Brazil, the Foreign Ministry is conducting a broad study of
the law of the sea. Brazil is considering a new position that favors

sovereignty over only 12 nautical miles adjacent to its coast. The
other 188 miles would remain as an exclusive economic zone.
Without resorting to decrees or documents, Brazil's position as a
supporter of the 200 mile territorial sea is set aside.

45

Delimitationof the ContinentalShelf
The Norwegian and Icelandic governments have both indicated

that they have accepted the recommendations by an arbitration
commission for a division of the continental shelf around Jan

Mayer. 4 6 These recommendations should serve as the basis for

139. San Diego Union, Aug. 21, 1981, § A, 7.
140. The Reagan Administration's handling of the dogfight with the Libyans
shows it does small things well. Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1981, at 22, coL 1.
141. Many countries have declared 200 mile fishing zones. The extensions have
had considerable impact on the world fishing industry since only about one percent of the world catch of fish occurs beyond 200 miles from shore. See Recent Developments 1978-1979, supra note 2, at 718 n.140.

142.

OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIrrrs IN THE SEAS 7

(No. 36, 4th rev. 1981).
143. Id.
144. Also, the India Coast Guard organization is exploring the possibilities of
acquiring jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedures to apprehend smugglers,
and other intruders in the Indian territorial waters. Patriot (New Delphi), July 1,
1981, at 4, reprinted in 164 WORLDWmE REPORTS, LAW OF

THE

SEA 5 (1981).

145. Journal do Brasil (Rio de Janero), Aug. 23, 1981, at 16, translatedand reprinted in 171 WORMWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 13 (1981).

146. This was the statement made by the American Chairman of the arbitration
commission Elliot Richardson, when he presented the Commission's recommendations at a Press Conference in Oslo, together with Ambassador Jens Evenson.

future negotiations. 47
The commission suggested that Iceland should have that part of
the continental shelf that extends 200 nautical miles from its
shores and follows the fishing zone boundary established last
year.148 At the same time, the commission recommends joint exploration by Norway and Iceland of any oil and gas resources on
the continental shelf. Each country would have rights to 25% of
the funds coming from development in the other country's
sector.149
The European Parliament voted unanimously to recognize the
preferential status for the territorial waters, economic zone and
continental shelf of the Greek islands. 5 0 The continental shelf
will figure in the customs boundaries of Europe.151
FishingDisputes
Recently, United States' tuna boats were seized while fishing in
Mexico's 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 152 While the
United States itself has declared a 200-mile fishing zone, it refuses
the right to control migratory fishing within such a zone. 53 The
United States' rationale is that a country should not be allowed to
control migratory fish just because they happen to swim within
Afterposten (Oslo), May 23, 1981, at 8, translatedand reprintedin 161 WoRmDWiDE
REPORTS, LAW OF T=E SEA 12 (1981). Elliot Richardson of the United States was

chairman of the arbitration commission.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. According to Richardson, the Commission has taken current Law of
the Sea regulations into consideration but they have not been found useful in the
Jan Mayan dispute. Richardson said the recommendation of the Commission to
have joint exploration of the resources rather than a demarcation line outside the
economic zone is based on thorough geological investigation of the area. The report also states that Iceland's total dependence on off imports and the fact that the
country's own continental shelf contains hardly any viable hydrocarbon deposits
was given consideration. Consideration was also given to the desire to promote
cooperation between Norway and Iceland.
150. Athens News (Athens), Sept. 19, 1981, at 12, reprintedin 172 WORLDWIDE
REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 22 (1981).
151. Ivradyni (Athens), June 18, 1981, at 1, 12, translatedand reprintedin 167
WoRLDwmE REPORTS, LAw OF THE SEA 13 (1981). The Greek position on the continental shelf of the Agean islands is completely vindicated.
152. See generally Recent Developments 1979-1980, supra note 17, 535, 573 (1981).
The '"Tuna War" caused by Mexico's ambitious expansion of its fleet, has led to a
U.S. embargo on Mexican tuna products. The Secretary of State can direct the
Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish and fish products
from any country which seizes United States fishing boats under a claim of jurisdiction. The Fishing Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1825(a) (4) (1976).
153. Under United States law, the 200-mile zone does not apply to highly
migratory fish such as tuna. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1) (1976). For a list of migratory
fish see Draft Convention, supra note 3, Annex L
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200 miles of its coast. 5 4
This may change. A bill was introduced to the House of Representatives on September 10th to revoke tuna fishing by foreign
vessels within the 200-mile offshore fishing limit. 5 5 "We have a
choice of allowing irreparable damage to the bluefin and other
tuna or preserving them as a domestic and economic resource,"
Representative James J. Howard (New Jersey) declared at a
hearing before the Merchants Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Fisheries.
Theodore Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, said any restrictions on tuna fishing
rights in United States' waters might provoke retaliation by for56
eign governments.
Japan, like the United States, believes that 200-mile exclusive
economic zones do not include migratory fish.1S7 A Japanese fishing trawler was seized inside the exclusive Seychelles maritime
economic zone. 5 8 In order to fish in this zone a fishing license
amounting to approximately 20,000 ruples a month must be
paid. 59
Since Canada and the United States have both declared 200mile fisheries jurisdiction, the countries have had problems delineating boundaries and agreeing on fisheries management. 60 In
March 1981, after nearly two years in committee and after amendments were added regarding scallop management, the fishing and
boundary portions of the agreement were separated. 6 1 The
154. Two San Diego based tunaboats, the Cindy Ann and the United States,
were seized east of Mazatlan in July. The tuna was confiscated and the boats were
fined. San Diego Union, July 15, 1981, § B, at 3, col. 5.
155. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1981, § 1, at 44, col. 1.
156. Negotiations between the United States and other countries might be
undercut.
157. Japan shares this view and also has suffered seizures. See Recent Developments 1978-1979, supra note 2, at 720 n.153.
158. The seizure occurred when a Japanese trawler was caught fishing illegally
inside the exclusive Seychelles Maritime Economic Zone. Nation (Victoria), Jan.
21, 1981, at 1, 2, translatedand reprintedin 141 WORLDWDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE
SEA 18 (1981).
159. Id. When the trawler was boarded there were 90 tons of fish on board.
The fishing service pointed out that foreign ships cannot fish in the interior of the

exclusive maritime economic zone without paying a fishing license amounting to
approximately 20,000 rubles per month in favor of the Seychelles state.

160. Soundings, June/July 1981, supra note 23, at 1. This has occurred in the
Gulf of Maine area. In 1977, negotiations began on these sensitive issues.
161. Id.

boundary settlement portion of the treaty is not in effect because
the United States amendments have not received Canadian approval.162 The East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement will be
withdrawn from Senate consideration soon.'6 A treaty between
the United States and Canada allowing full and unlimited fishing
for albacore and warm water tuna in the Pacific Coast was ratified
by the Senate by a vote of 97-0.164
Iceland and the Faeroes signed a new 1981 fishing pact in Reykjavik. According to the pact, the Faeroes will be permitted to
fish within the Icelandic 200 mile limit. The main emphasis has
been to limit the fishing of cod. The Faeroes may catch only 6,000
tons. 165 There now exist agreements that authorize Belgium, the
Faeroes Island and Norway to fish within the Icelandic fishing
66
waters.1
A two year renewable fishing contract was signed between Jamaica and Colombia, ending eleven years of negotiations between
the two countries. Seizure of Jamaican fishing boats should be
eliminated with the signing of the agreement.167
At a recent fisheries meeting in Havana, Sri Lanka was given
the task of coordinating the nonaligned countries for joint ventures in industrial fishing.168 Sri Lanka's Minister of Fisheries
told the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation that the honor was
significant because of the abundance of unexploited fishery re69
sources in the Indian Ocean.1
Porpoise Quotas
The Reagan administration has thrown support behind efforts
to ease the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act which regulates
the tuna industry in the United States.170 Annual quotas for
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1981, § A, at 5, coL 5.
165. Morgunbladid (Reykjavik), Jan. 16, 1981, at 16, translatedand reprintedin
141 WoRLDwmE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 25 (1981).
166. Id.
167. The Daily Gleaner (Kingston), Aug. 1, 1981, at 1, reprintedin 167 WoRLDWME REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 7 (1981). Dr. Neville Gallimore, Minister of State
in the Foreign Affairs Ministry who signed for Jamaica, said that Jamaican
fishermen were now allowed to catch 840 metric tons of fish annually off the Colombian coasts.
168. Colombo Int'l Service, Apr. 24, 1981, reprintedin 155 WORLWEmDE REPORTS,
LAw OF THE SEA 2 (1981). Among other matters taken up at the Havana Conference was the role of the traditional small-scale fisherman, shipbuilding, better
marketing facilities, and the exchange of scientific and technological information.
169. Id. Sri Lanka's Minister of Fisheries, Festus Perera, was elected the Vicechairman of the Conference. Four steering Committees were approved.
170. The Commerce Department has adopted regulations limiting the number
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porpoises that fisherman inadvertently kill in the course of netting tuna would be eliminated by a bill pending in the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.171 Environmentalists
and the tuna industry agree that fishermen are now saving
enough porpoises from their nets to avoid depleting the Pacific
area porpoise herds.172 The levels would not have to approach
zero to be acceptable.
Meeting of the InternationalWhaling Commission
President Reagan made a personal plea to the International
Commission on Whaling (IWC)173 for an indefinite moratorium on
commercial whaling. 7 4 So far, cooperative efforts to regulate
whaling have been unsuccessful. Species after species have been
overexploited. Soon after, the IWC rejected a ban on commercial
whaling. Sixteen countries voted for the moratorium proposed by
the United States and Britain, eight voted against, three abstained and three others did not take part. For the sixth year the
vote did not reach the seventy-five percent majority necessary to
stop whaling. 7 5 " he nations of this IWC voted two to one to stop
whaling but the slaughter of these magnificent creatures will continue."17 6 The IWC did impose a virtual ban on the hunting of
sperm whales.
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of porpoises that may be killed as tuna are netted. The 1981 limit is set at 20,500
porpoises. L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1980, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
171. The amendment to the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act now pending
in the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee is significant because it
removes costly and impractical requirements in present law to reduce the porpoise kill to "levels approaching zero". San Diego Union, July 14, 1981, § A, at 1,
col.2.
172. Porpoises are often found with migrating yellow fin tuna, and fishermen inevitably trapped large numbers of porpoises which were drowned before they
could free themselves. Tuna fishermen developed nets and techniques that have
reduced the kill from an estimated 300,000 a year to only 7,500 this year. San Diego
Union, July 16, 1981, § B, at 10, col. 1.
173. The International Whaling Commission was established by the International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, TJ.AS.
No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
174. Reagan's views were made known in a letter delivered to the 30-nation
commission at the start of its annual meeting. Japan, one of the major whaling
nations, said in its opening statement that it found no legal or moral obligation to
accept such a moratorium. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1981, § 1, at 5, col 5.
175. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1981, § 1, at 5, col 1.
176. Id. David Phillips represented the Friends of the Earth group.
177. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1981, § 4, at 22, col 1. For several kinds of whales-blue,
fin, humpback and gray-protections that have been imposed in the last few years
may be late. There may be hope, though, for the sperm whale. After the 1981 sea-

Antarctic Experimental Program

Marine scientists from South Africa and ten other countries
have begun an experimental program to study the extent and the
distribution of krill in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica.
Their purpose is to provide controls over the future exploitation
of this important protein resource.178
The krill, a shrimp-like organism, is a vital link in the food chain
of this region of the southern hemisphere. The Southern Ocean
could provide a harvest of krill equal to the total amount of fish
caught annually in the world. Its abundance needs to be known
more accurately before large scale exploitation can be considered.
The experiment is part of an internationally planned program
known as BIOMASS (Biological Investigations of Marine
Antarctic Systems and Stocks).179
Offshore Petroleum Exploration,Federalismv. States' Rights
A federal judge held that California can veto government programs if they are deemed inconsistent with its coastal managerial
plans. Judge Marion Phaezen said the state can block the Department of Interior's sale of oil drilling leases for more than 150,000
acres of coastal water.180 With 80,000,000 potentially oil rich acres
in offshore areas in the balance, along with 795 million acres abutting other coastal states, Departmental lawyers plan to appeal.181
After the decision, Secretary James G. Watt said offshore drilling
off the Northern California coast would be deferred at least until
1983.182
The Interior Department also said it would modify its offshore
oil and gas drilling program to provide for greater consideration of
son the International Whaling Commission will impose a virtual ban on the killing
of sperm whales.
178. South African Journal of Science (Johannesburg) Feb. 1981, at 65, re-

printed in 161 WORLDWIME REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 11 (1981).

179. Id. Last year, 15 countries concerned with the Antarctic region agreed at a
convention to conserve its marine life. A commission will be established as a result of this meeting. A scientific committee under the commission will then be established to encourage and to co-ordinate scientific studies. The BIOMASS
program will contribute information on the ecology of the Southern Ocean.
180. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1981, § 4, at 22, col 1.
181. Id.
182. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 8, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2. Governor Brown said Watt's
announcement signals "a major retreat in his efforts to desecrate the California
coast." The Governor pledged to continue to fight in the courts and in Congress
until Watt "once and for all ceases and desists his continuing efforts to despoil our
coast." Deferring drilling until 1983 would give the United States Supreme Court
time to rule on whether states have veto power over such decisions. Watt's action
rules out a lease sale this year to award drilling rights in four offshore areas covering 700,000 acres.
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environmental risks. 8 3 Environmental groups and state governments have asserted that the pace of the leasing program would
make it difficult to protect marine habitats and coastal economies
dependent on fishing and tourism. This decision of the Interior
Department was made in response to an order issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 8 4
Costs and risks in the program should include a better weighing
of "environmental" and "social" costs. Secretary James G. Watt
said that there would now be "technical" and analytical modifications of the leasing program. The leasing program is designed to
make a billion acres of the continental shelf available for explora185
tion by off and gas companies over the next five years.
Deep Sea Nodules
India is planning a major venture into deep sea mining following the recent discovery of huge areas of polymetallic nodules in
the Indian Ocean.186 The Minister of State for Science and Technology told Parliament the nodules were found on a large scale
near a crater about 240 kilometers from the southern tip of Indian
territory. The exploration and survey of deepsea nodules is a major project, to be coordinated on an all-India basis.187 West Germany has agreed to supply equipment, a ship, and provide a soft
loan to assist India in this project. 88
Marine Pollution
A decree was issued approving Kuwait's membership in an international treaty over the right to interfere in case of an accident
causing oil pollution on the high seas. The treaty was drawn up
in Brussels in November of 1969 and covers the right of member
countries to take necessary measures to protect their coasts from
183. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1981, § 1, at 15, coL 1. The Court of Appeals ruled on a
series of suits brought by California, Alaska and the Natural Resources Defense
Council.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The Working People's Daily (Ragoon), Apr. 11, 1981, at 4, reprintedin 156
WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 10 (1981).
187. 1& The Minister of State for Science and Technology said the government
had decided this. The samples of the nodules were brought up by the country's
oceanic research vessel Gaveshani (Researcher). The samples turned up contained manganese, nickle, cobalt and copper.
188. Id

damage that oil pollution might cause. 8 9
Delegates from eleven countries in Asia and the Pacific met in
Manila to discuss marine pollution in waterways, harbors and
ports. This was organized by UNESCO's Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Committee on Marine affairs.190
CONCLUSION

The United States' second thoughts about specific provisions of
the Draft Convention place it at odds with a significant portion of
the UNCLOS III membership that desires to conclude a treaty in
1982.191 Accordingly, years of careful negotiations are endangered. A future attitude of conciliation will be essential if the parties are to complete a successful and meaningful treaty.
Developments beyond the Conference continue to demonstrate
the need for an agreement.
BERNICE
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189. The Arab Weekly (Beirut), Jan. 31, 1981, at 8, reprintedin 141 WORLDWIDE
REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 14 (1981).
190. Daily Express (Philippines), March 5, 1981, at 7, reprintedin 141 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 7 (1981). This is the second international work-

shop on marine pollution in two months. The current conference is dubbed the
WESTPAC task team. "WESTPAC envisions establishing an International Mussel
watch similar to the one organized in the eastern Pacific region, particularly on the
seaboard visited by watercraft." Some 106 monitoring stations were organized,
measuring the amount of water pollution by observing the nondegradable heavy
metals and hydrocarbons absorbed by certain species of shellfish.
191. The United States recently announced it will resume negotiations for the
Law of the Sea treaty. A statement by President Reagan, however, warned that
the United States is determined to change "unacceptable elements" in the
treaty-especially the deep seabed mining provisions. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1982,
§ 1, at 12, col. 4.

